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Public workfare programs have been important counter-cyclical  program  interventions  in
both  developed  and  developing  countries.  In  the  developing  world  generally  and  in
Africa  and  Asia  particularly,  public  works  programs  have  been  significant  policy
instruments  for  mitigating  the  negative  effects  of climatic  and  systemic  risks  on  poor
farmers  and  unskilled  and  semi-skilled  workers.  The paper  first discusses  the  rationale
behind  workfare programs  in the context of social  risk management  and goes  on to give
an overview of workfare programs in Africa and Asia with respect to such design features
as wage rates  and labor  intensity and to how they were  selected and  implemented.  Using
available  estimates  and  evaluations,  the  evidence  on  whether  these  programs  have
achieved  their goals and are cost-effective  is presented.  Finally, the paper concludes with
summary lessons from experience.ITable of Contents
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Public  works  programs  have  been  important  counter-cyclical  program  interventions  in
developed  as  well  as  developing  countries  for  many  years.  In  the  developing  world
generally  and in Asia and Africa particularly,  public works programs have  significantly
mitigated the negative effects of climatic  risks on poor farmers and farm laborers.  These
programs  typically  provide  unskilled  manual  workers  with  short-term  employment  on
projects  such  as  road  construction  and  maintenance,  irrigation  infrastructure,
reforestation,  and  soil  conservation.  This  type  of program  has  been  used  to  counter
climatic  risks  in  several  countries  (for  example,  Bangladesh,  India,  Ethiopia,  Kenya,
Zimbabwe,  South  Africa,  Tanzania,  and  Ghana);  it  was  recently  used  as  the  main
instrument  to  counter  the  financial  risk-induced  unemployment  in  Korea  in  1997.
Although  known  as  "public"  works  programs,  in  several  countries  the  actual
implementation  of these  programs  is  being  handled  by  small-scale  private  contractors,
NGOs, or social funds.
The  rationale  for  public  works  programs  rests  on  six  considerations.  First,  the
programs  provide  income  transfers  to  poor  households  during  critical  times.  Second,
depending  upon  their  timing,  the  programs  also  allow  households  to  meet  any
consumption  shortfalls  they may  experience  during  slack  agricultural  seasons  or  years.
Third,  well-designed  workfare  programs  construct  much-needed  infrastructure  and  thus
minimize  the  trade-off  between  public  spending  on  income  transfers  versus  public
spending on development.  Fourth,  the durable  assets that these programs create have the
potential  to  generate  second-round  employment  benefits  as  needed  infrastructure  is
developed.  Fifth,  the  programs  can  easily be  targeted  to  specific  geographic  areas that
have  high  unemployment  and  poverty  rates.  Finally,  in  many  countries,  this  type  of
program has helped many small-scale private contractors to emerge  and grow.
The success of each program depends very much on its design features.  The level of
the wage  rate  is  a  critical  design  feature.  Self-selection  can  be  encouraged  if the wage
paid by the public  works program  is set at slightly  below the market wage for unskilled
labor.  Cross-country  experience  reviewed  in  this  chapter  suggests  that,  although
governments  vary widely  in their ability to  set a wage  rate  that is consistent with  self-
selection,  several  countries have adopted innovative ways to set wages that promote self-
selection.  The  way  in  which  the wage  is paid  also  influences  the  degree  to which  the
program  is targeted  to the  poor  generally  and  to women  in particular.  In  some  African
countries,  women  favored  task-based  wage  payments  because  this  enabled  them  to
dovetail household chores with their income-generating  activities.
An important determinant  of the cost-effectiveness  of the program is the share of the
wage bill  in the  total cost of the  program.  Experience  reviewed  in this chapter suggests
that achieving  high  labor  intensity  is  not  easy in  practice,  even  when  common  labor-
based methods of production are available.  Careful  attention to detail is needed to achievehigh  labor  intensity  without  compromising  the  quality  of  the  assets  to  be  created.
Evidence  about the  cost-effectiveness  of public  works programs  suggests that programs
are  worthwhile  only if planners  give  careful  attention  to the  quality of the  assets  to  be
created  and to the  potential  of such assets  to  create  second-round  employment  benefits.
Future benefits  from public works  can be substantial  if the program  is well designed and
implemented; the program will then be cost-effective.
A word of caution is needed in interpreting  the cost-effectiveness  calculations  cited
in this paper.  These calculations  take into account only the transfer  benefits given to the
poor. The risk benefits of the program-the  benefits of reduced risks due to consumption
smoothing-are  rarely  factored  into the calculations  of cost-effectiveness.  This is one of
the reasons  why  the  cost-effectiveness  calculations  often do not  appear  very favorable.
Another limitation of cost-effectiveness  calculations is that only they only take account of
direct transfer benefits.  The indirect benefits (such as the short-  and medium-term effects
of the program on the rural market wage rate, and the socially beneficial  effects of female
empowerment)  have not been taken into account in the available  estimates of benefits and
costs  of workfare  programs.  Also,  when  comparing  the  cost-effective  calculations  of
workfare  programs  with  other  transfer  programs,  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  the
savings in administrative  costs afforded by self-selection  in addition to other factors.
The main constraint in implementing  public works programs  in much of Africa  is a
lack  of capacity.  This  constraint  can  be eased  if donors  coordinate  their activities  and
provide  assistance  to  build  private  contracting  capacity.  In  all  countries  and  in  Sub-
Saharan African  countries  particularly,  assured  funding,  community participation,  sound
technical  assistance,  and proper understanding  of the  social structures  and communities
where the projects are located can vastly increase the effectiveness of workfare programs.Systemic Shocks and Social Protection:
Role and Effectiveness of Public Works
Programs
Kalanidhi  Subbarao, Lead Economist (Social Protection),
Africa Human Development'
I. Introduction
Public  works  programs2  have  been  important  counter-cyclical  interventions  in  both
developed  and developing  countries during the  last century.  In England,  workhouse relief, to
which the able-bodied poor were restricted  after England's  1834  Poor Law Amendment  Act,
explicitly  self-targeted  the poor by aiming to "provide  pay and  conditions  less  eligible than
the meanest  available  alternative"  (Himmelfarb,  1984).  Several  Western  countries  adopted
different  types  of public  works  programs  during  the depression  years  (1931-36)  and  again
during  milder recessions.  In much of South Asia, public works programs began in the  1950s
as "food-for-work"  programs  in which workers  were paid  for their labor with food aid from
Western  countries.  These  programs  are now  operated  by the  govermnents  of the  region as
"cash-for-work"  programs that provide  short-term  employment  at low wage rates.  In Korea,
the public  workfare program  constituted  a core safety net during the financial  crisis of 1997-
98.
Public  works  programs  typically  provide  short-term  employment  at  low  wages  for
unskilled  and semi-skilled  workers  on  labor-intensive  projects  such as road  construction  and
maintenance,  irrigation  infrastructure,  reforestation,  and  soil  conservation.  Public  works
programs  are now viewed as a means of providing income support to the poor in critical  times
rather  than as a way of getting the unemployed  back into the labor market.  The lessons to be
learned  from  public  workfare  programs  are  relevant  for all  risk-prone  countries  and  for the
countries  of Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  Asia particularly  because  of the programs'  considerable
potential  for  helping the  poor to  cope  with the  co-variate  risks associated  with climatic  and
systemic  shocks.  In some countries, the programs  have been  implemented  on a national  scale,
whereas  in  other countries,  the programs  have  been  only  one  component  of a multi-sectoral
intervention,  for  example,  in  Social  Investment  Funds.  Table  I  provides  information  on the
scale of operation of public works programs for selected developing countries.
l I would like to thank John Blomquist, Polly Jones, and  Julie Van  Domelen  for helpful suggestions.  The  paper
also benefited from my informal discussions with Alan Gelb
2 The terms "public works programs" and "workfare programs"  are used interchangeably  throughout  this paper.
Both  refer to  programs  in  which participants  must  work  to  obtain  benefits.  These programs  offer temporary
employment at a low wage rate and have been widely used for fighting poverty.Table la: Scale of Operations of Public Works Programs in Selected  Countries: National
Programs
Country  Person  Days
Botswana (1992-93)  7 million person days
Ghana (1988-91)  0.5  person days
Kenya (1992-93)  0.6 person days
India National  (1994)  800-900 person  days
Chile (1987)  40-45 person days
Egypt  27-30 person days
Argentina (1998-2000)  400,000 persons
Source: World Bank (1994) and Subbarao  (1997).
Table lb: Scale of Operations of Public Works Programs in Selected  Countries: Programs
Implemented  under Social  Investment Funds (midl980s  to early 1990s)
Country and  Program  Employment Generated
Bolivia: FSE  731,000 person-months
Honduras: ZIF  140,000 person-months
El Salvador:  FIS  55,400 person-months
Peru:  FONCODES  24,500 person-months
Panama:  FES  28,000 person-months
Nicaragua:  FISE  73,000 person-months
Source: World Bank (1994)  and Subbarao  (1997).
There  is  much  variation  in  the  meaning  and  scope  of public  works  programs  (also
known  as workfare  programs)  across  countries.  The term  "public  works"  often  creates the
impression that the program  is a government-run  program to "create" jobs. This was indeed
the  case  in  much  of the  former  Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe  where  public  works
programs  were  understood  to  imply  a  "wage  subsidy"  program,  in  other  words,  that  the
government paid the entire wage bill to encourage private entrepreneurs  and state enterprises
to  hire  more  workers  and  thus  "solve"  the  unemployment  problem.  This  view  is  slowly
changing inasmuch  as attempts are being made in some Central Asian republics to introduce-
public works  at low wages  as  a short-term  income  transfer program  for the poor along the
lines of programs in South Asia.
In  recent  years,  because  the implementation  arrangements  for  public  works  programs
have changed,  the word "public"  in "public works"  has become  somewhat  inaccurate.  In the
"old  style"  public  works  programs,  typically  the  public  works  departments  of  central
governments  financed  and  implemented  these programs.  As  a result, they tended  to  suffer
from  the  drawbacks  of  other  centralized  programs,  including  the  creation  of  large
bureaucratic  structures,  a  lack  of  accountability,  and  little  consultation  with  local
communities  and governments  in the selection and  execution of projects.  In recent years,  in
some  countries,  the  "provider"  or  "financier"  of the  program  (usually  the government  but
2also NGOs or international  aid agencies  such as the  World  Food Program) has often been  a
different  entity from the program's  "implementor"  who may be  either the  line ministries of
the government, a private contractor,  an NGO, or a Social Investment Fund.
The  paper  is  organized  into  six  main  sections.  The  next  section  provides  a  brief
overview of the rationale  for workfare  programs  in the  developing  world.  The third  section
provides  an overview  of conceptual  issues.  The  fourth  section discusses  the  design  features
of public workfare programs,  reviewing relevant country experiences.  The fifth section gives
a  brief overview  of the  available  evaluations  with  reference  to  benefits  and  costs  and  the
distributional  outcomes  of workfare  programs.  The  last section provides  a  synthesis of how
to plan, implement, and evaluate a public workfare program.
II. Rationale
The  argument  for public  works  in  19'h  Century  England  was  centered  on the  ethic of work,
which  usually  meant  dirty  and  nasty  menial  labor.  The justification  for  such public  works
during the Depression years was largely the macro need to restore  aggregate demand.  In many
low-income  countries  today,  however,  the rationale  for launching  a public  works program  is
vastly different from the motivations  behind the launch of past programs in the West.
In low-income  countries,  public workfare programs  are  undertaken with four objectives
in mind:
*  First, these  programs  provide  transfer benefits  to the  poor.  The  transfer  benefit  is
equal  to the wage  rate minus any  costs of participation  incurred  by the worker.  In
countries  with  high  unemployment  rates,  transfer  benefits  from  a  good  workfare
program  can  prevent  poverty  from  worsening,  especially  during  periods  of
adjustment or transition.
*  Second,  the  programs,  depending  on  their timing,  may  also  confer  consumption-
smoothing  or  stabilization  benefits  on  program  recipients.  These  stabilization
benefits arise mainly from the reduction of the risk that poor households  will face a
decrease  in their consumption  during slack  agricultural  seasons.  For example,  if a
program  is  implemented  during  these  slack  agricultural  seasons  when the market
demand  for labor  is  low, workers  employed  by the program  will  benefit  from the
resulting  injection  of  income  and  consequential  consumption  smoothing.  Any
policy  intervention  that  lessens  the  risks  of starvation  for  those  surviving  on the
edge of poverty should be valued highly.
*  Third,  these  programs,  if well  designed,  can help  to  build  much-needed  physical
infrastructure.  For  example,  the  famous  Maharashtra  Employment  Guarantee
Scheme  in  India, which  has been  in operation  for over three decades,  has created
considerable  irrigation  infrastructure  and  rural  roads  in  the  state of Maharashtra.
Some of the durable assets created by the program have generated  (or can generate)
additional second-round  employment benefits.
*  Fourth,  these  programs  can  be  targeted  to  specific  geographic  areas  that have  high
unemployment and poverty rates. Poor areas and communities can directly benefit from
the  program  (in  terms  of transfer  benefits)  and  indirectly  benefit  in  terms  of the
physical  assets that the program creates  and/or maintains. To this extent, well-designed
workfare programs can enhance the growth potential of less endowed regions.
3In addition there can be other (often unintended)  spin offs from public works programs.
For example, workfare  programs can build the capacity of communities to manage their own
affairs  by  strengthening  local  governments  and  other  institutions.  If the  program's  design
features  are  carefully  thought through  (see section  four),  it  can encourage  the participation
and empowerment of women.  Also, in many countries, this type of program has helped many
small-scale  private contractors  to emerge  and grow,  and in some countries,  the private sector
and NGOs have been involved  in the implementation  of public works programs. Finally, the
link  between  workfare  programs  and  household  food  security  needs  to  be  mentioned.  In
much  of Africa  and  South  Asia,  public  works  programs  originated  as  "food-for-work"
programs that paid wages in food, usually provided by donors. Even now, some donor-driven
programs  (for example,  those of the  World  Food  Program)  run public  works  programs  in
many  African  countries  providing  food  as  wages,  the  motivation  being  to  ensure  the  food
security of poor households.
Thus,  in  low-income  countries,  public  works  programs  are  undertaken  with  multiple
objectives  including  providing  temporary  income  transfer  benefits  to  the  poor,  smoothing
consumption,  ensuring  household  food  security,  creating  assets,  and developing  poor areas.
These programs are often regarded as vital in helping populations  cope with the climatic risks
that are pervasive in much of Africa and Asia.
III. Conceptual  Issues
The  transfer benefit to a worker  amounts  to  the  wage  he/she  gets from  the scheme,  minus
any  costs  of participation  (such  as  the  cost  of  transport)  and  any  earnings  lost  from
alternative  employment. If the costs of participation  and income from alternative  sources are
negligible  and if the program  has  no effect  on the labor market and the structure of market
wages, the transfer  benefit should be approximately the same  as the program wage times the
duration of employment.  In reality, these assumptions  are unlikely to hold. For example, the
costs of participation  and  foregone earnings are rarely zero. Most workers have  to walk long
distances  to the program's work sites or incur transport costs. In the absence  of the scheme,
workers typically work for a few days in alternative jobs, which they give  up when slightly
longer-term  employment  is offered by a public works project.  Moreover,  unless the scale of
the public works program is very limited,  the program is likely to put an upward pressure on
the market wage rate, in which case the net transfer benefit (the direct program wage benefit
and the indirect benefit of an increment in market wage resulting from the program)  may be
higher  than the  program  wage.  Thus,  depending  upon  what  impact  the  scheme  has  on the
wage rate, on workers'  foregone  earnings,  and on their costs of participation,  the net transfer
benefit may be higher or lower than the program wage.
In  order  to  enable workers  to  self-select  themselves  into  the  program,  it  is desirable  to
keep  the  wage paid by the program  low, in other words,  somewhat  lower than the prevailing
market wage for unskilled labor.  A low wage is likely to make the program unattractive to the
non-poor.  A low wage will keep the overall participation  rate low and at the same time ensure
that  a  disproportionate  number  of poor workers  will  participate  in  the  program,  a  higher
proportion than would be  the case if the program  wage were  higher.  Given a  strictly defined
budget,  a low wage  would avoid job rationing.  Thus, a low program  wage has several  merits.
However, a low wage rate will also result in low transfer earnings to each (poor) participant.
4Finally,  in some  situations,  the poor may incur transaction  costs that may further  reduce
their transfer  benefit.  For example,  if the program's  implementing  agencies  and institutional
framework  are  affected  by corruption  and  leakage,  the  poor  who participate  in the  program
may have to pay  a part of their wage  to scheme  organizers to  ensure  continued participation,
which may further  reduce the  transfer benefit  of the  program.  The  particular  implementation
arrangements,  the institutional  framework,  and the overall  efficiency of scheme administration
also greatly effect the total amount of transfer benefits that accrue to participants.
The sum of total transfer  earnings going to all participants will be larger as the duration
of workers'  employment  and  the  share of wages  in the  total  cost of the  program  increase.
These  last  two  parameters-the  share  of wages  and  the  duration  of employment-vary
depending  on the  nature of the project selected  for implementation.  As will be mentioned in
later  sections,  there  is  much  cross-country  variation  in  both  the  share  of wages  in  total
program cost and the duration of employment.
The potential welfare  gains  from a public works program  also depend on the source of
financing. If a public works program is entirely aid-financed,  the transfer benefits to workers
are  a  net addition to  all  other  benefits  flowing  from  programs  funded  out of general  tax
revenues.  However,  if the  programn is funded out  of general  tax  revenues,  it is important  to
look  at  the  counterfactual  situation-in  other  words,  what  would  have  been  the  benefits
accruing  to  participants  from  alternative  ways of spending  the  same  amount  of budgetary
resources.  Also,  it  is  useful  to  know  if a  public  works  program  has  been  introduced  or
extended at the expense of other  activities that give non-labor  benefits,  such as  education or
hospital  services,  to poor  participants.  It  is  rarely  possible  to  evaluate  this  counterfactual
empirically,  but it is important to bear in mind the source of the financing for a public works
program in trying to estimate the true benefits of the program.
The  stabilization benefit  of the  program  reflects  the  program's  "insurance"  function.
This  depends  on  the  timing  of the  program.  In  predominantly  agricultural  societies,
household incomes  increase or decrease depending upon seasonal activities. Poor households
often suffer from precipitous  shortfalls in consumption and nutritional  status in slack seasons
and during  periods  or years of drought.  A workfare program  targeted to those regions  most
affected  by monsoon  failures  or  by  seasonal  drops  in economic  activity  can  enable  poor
participants  to  smooth their  consumption,  thus  significantly  reducing  their exposure  to risk.
Stabilizing their income can prevent acute distress and prevent poor households from having
to sell  off their assets  during years or seasons of crop failure.  In other words, the risk-coping
benefits  of a  public  works  program  can  be  as  important  as  the  transfer  benefit  to  poor
households  who lack options  or who cannot  afford to insure themselves.  However,  it is not
always  possible  to  implement  a program  precisely  at  those times  when  the  poor  are  most
likely to sustain consumption  shortfalls.  For example,  during periods of heavy rainfall  when
all  economic  activities  come  to  a halt,  logistics  may  not  permit the  implementation  of a
public works program  especially  in remote  villages,  so  a workfare program may not be the
most appropriate instrument to protect the poor during the "hungry" season.
IV. Design  Features: Cross-Country Evidence
This  section  considers  the  design  features  of public  works  programs  using  three  broad
criteria:  (i) how to enhance the benefits accruing to participants;  (ii) how to increase the cost-
effectiveness  of a workfare  program;  and (iii)  how to implement  such a program.  The  first
5two sub-sections  cover  only  major,  national-level  programs,  whereas  the third  sub-section
also  looks  at  small-scale  workfare  programs  implemented  under  the  rubric  of  Social
Investment Funds.3
Design Features  that Maximize Program  Benefits to thze Poor
There  are  four important  features  of workfare  programs  that must be  carefully designed  to
maximize the amount of program  benefits that accrue to the poor:  the level of the wage rate,
the mode of wage payment,  the duration and timing of the public works themselves,  and the
labor intensity of the program.
The level of  the wage rate. The wage rate is a key element in determining the degree to
which  the poor  self-select  themselves  into  the  program  and,  therefore,  in determining  the
distributional  outcomes  of the  program.  In  order  to  promote  self-selection,  it  is  best  if a
public works  program offers  a wage  slightly below the  market wage,  in other words,  if the
program  maintains the level of its wage  at a rate  low enough  so that only the poor would be
attracted  to  the program.  Experience  in  setting  a wage  below  the  prevailing  market  wage
varies  across  countries.  Some  governments  have  been  unable to  set  a wage  lower than the
minimum  wage,  and often the official minimum wage  is higher than the market wage in the
informal  sector  and in rural  farm  activities  in which  the  poorest tend to  be  engaged.  If the
minimum wage is set at a level higher than the market-clearing wage and is strictly enforced,
then there  is only limited  scope  for a public works program to set its wage  at a level  lower
than the minimum wage and foster self-targeting to the poor.
As can be seen  from Table 2,  there is much  cross-country  variation  in the  level of the
program  wage rate relative  to the  market  and minimum  wages rates.  In Chile,  the program
wage rate  was maintained  at about 70 percent of the minimum wage,  which  encouraged  the
poor  to self-target  themselves  into  the program.  Almost  a  quarter  of the  participants  were
women.  In Kenya, the program  wage  was  equal to the  minimum wage,  which was typically
much higher than the prevailing market  wage.  In the Philippines  too, the program  wage was
25  percent  higher  than  the  agricultural  market  wage.  The  Philippines  case  is  particularly
interesting from a design perspective.  In the Philippines, the program cash wage was equal to
the minimum wage. However,  in addition to the cash wage, an additional  in-kind wage in the
form  of  a  certain  quantity  of  food  was  also  given  to  every  participant,  so  that  total
compensation  (cash plus food) turned out to be much higher than the ruling market wage for
unskilled labor.  Not  surprisingly,  substantial  numbers of the  non-poor were  attracted  to the
program  (Subbarao et al,  1995).
The  targeting  effectiveness  achieved  by  setting  the  public  works  wage  below  the
minimum  wage  depends  on  whether  or  not  that minimum  wage  rate  is  really  the  market
minimum.  This  is  clearly  illustrated  by  the  case  of the  Employment  Guarantee  Scheme
(MEGS)  in the Indian  state  of Maharashtra.  In this program,  every registered  participant  is
"guaranteed"  employment at the minimum wage rate within a radius of five kilometers  from
his  or her  home.  The  program  was  enormously  successful  in  drawing  vast numbers  of the
poor, especially  women,  to work  sites. Right  from its inception  in  1973,  the program  wage
was equal to the minimum wage,  which was low enough to promote the self-selection  of the
3The main reason  is that no detailed information  on the design features or cost-effectiveness  of those workfare
programs  implemented under the rubric of Social Investment Funds is available.
6poor into the program.  In  1988,  the minimum  wage was doubled  so the program wage  also
had to be doubled. The consequence  has been a significant drop in the number of person days
of employment generated  (Figure  1; see also Subbarao  1993 and  1997). Research by Datt and
Ravallion (1994) has confirmed that the upward revision of the wage  rate in 1988  contributed
to job rationing and  eroded the "guarantee"  of employment  expected  of the program.  Gaiha
(2000)  also noted that targeting efficiency  had been eroded following the wage hike  in 1988.
The relatively  more affluent have joined the program, whereas  some poor participants  were
rationed out of the program.  In Tanzania  and  Botswana too,  because the program wage  was
maintained  at  a level  higher than the  market wage  for comparable  unskilled  activities, jobs
had to  be rationed,  particularly  during  droughts  when the  need of the poor to participate  in
public  works  was  greatest  (Teklu,  1994).  In  Burkina  Faso,  Senegal,  and  Sri  Lanka,  the
program wages were lower than the market wage rates in those countries for unskilled labor.
Table 2: The Program Wage (PW),  Minimum Wage (MNNW),and  Market Wage  (MW)  in
Selected  Countries
Country/Program  PW in Relation to MAW and/or MW
1.  Bangladesh:  Cash For Work, 1991-92  PW<MW
2.  India:  (a) Cash For Work, JRY,  1991-92  PW=MNW>MW
(b,) MEGS: up to  1988  PW=MNW<MW
(b2) After  1988  PW=MNW>MW
3.  Pakistan: IGPRA*  III,  1992  PW<MW
4.  Philippines:  Cash For Work  1990  PW>MW
Food For Work  1987  . PW**>MW
5.  Botswana:  Cash For Work  PW<MNW,  but >MW
6.  Kenya:  Cash For Work  1992-93  PW=MNW>MW
7.  Chile: Cash For Work  1987  PW<MNW=MW
8.  Argentina (a)  1997-2000  PW = MNW<MW
(b) 2000  PW<MNW<MW
9.  Korea:  1998  PW=MNW<MW
10  Thailand  1998  PW=MNW
11.  Indonesia (Reformed  Program,  1999)  PW<MW
Source  Subbarao (1997 and  1999); Ravallion (2000)
In  Argentina  in  1996,  the  government  responded  to  high  levels  of unemployment  by
starting  the  Trabajar  program,  a  public  workfare  program  designed  to  provide  temporary
employment benefits to poor participants.  The main targeting mechanism adopted was the low
wage  rate,  supplemented  by a sub-project  selection process  that geographically  targeted  poor
areas to receive projects.  Over 400,000 people participated  in this program  in  16,000 projects,
many of which were located  in poor communities.  In 2000, the setting and maintaining a low
wage rate became  an issue in Argentina.  To promote  self-selection,  the wage rate was further
lowered  from 200  pesos  per  month to  160  pesos per  month,  which  is  below  the minimum
wage. There  was no legal impediment,  since the labor relationship between the worker and the
implementing  agency  was  not typical.  For example,  the payment to  a worker  is not called  a
7"wage,"  rather  it  is termed  "subsistence"  or  "economic  assistance."  Moreover,  some  skilled
and semi-skilled  workers were also needed to execute  the projects.  Skilled  workers were hired
as  "foremen"  in each  project at  a somewhat  higher wage  rate.  Clearly,  Trabajar  represents  a
case  in  which  the  low  wage  rate  enabled  the  poor  to  self-select  into  the  program  and
geographic  targeting  gave  poor  households  significant  benefits  to  the  extent  that  selected
projects were located in poor areas.
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Source  Subbarao (1993).
South Africa's recent experience  is also worth noting. Evidence  from  101  Western  Cape
public works projects  shows that fewer than 36 percent of the public works projects managed
to offer a wage  lower than the prevailing  market  wage for unskilled  labor  (Table  3).  Some
projects  in  some  districts  were  more  successful  than  others  in  setting  a  low  wage.  For
example,  greening  and  vegetation  projects  offered  a  wage  less  than  the  market  wage,  but
construction  projects  did  not.  The reasons for this difference  are not entirely  clear,  but it is
likely that there  is  more  wage  bargaining  in  the  construction  industry  and/or  construction
projects  could  attract  labor  only  if they offered  a  higher  wage.  Research  by Adato  et.  al.
(1999)  confirms  that  the  wage  setting  process  in  South  Africa  is  extremely  complex  and
varies  a  great  deal  by  district  and  by  project.  In  general,  the  researchers  concluded  that
sharing information on the broader goals of public works projects with the community helped
workers to understand why the wages that were offered were so low.
Korea  has  introduced  public  workfare  programs  on two  occasions,  once  prior to  the
boom period and again in the wake of the financial  crisis of 1997.  In the  1970s,  the first of
these programs offered temporary employment at the going market wage  for unskilled  labor.
The program executed a number of infrastructure  projects, especially in road construction.  As
the economy entered the boom period in the late 1970s and early  1980s, the market wage for
8labor  soared.  As  a  result,  the  program  began  to  attract  only  the  very  old  and  less  active
workers. The program's productivity suffered as a consequence,  and its usefulness in creating
useful  assets diminished  as well.  The program  was then  abandoned;  the  elderly  among the
population began to be supported  largely by their extended  families and by a small-scale cash
transfer program.  In terms of the introduction  and abandonment  of the program, the Korean
government's timing was perfect.
Table 3: Public Works Projects in Western Cape, South Africa: Project Wages for Unskilled
Labor
Proportion  of  Projects  Setting Wages Below District
Program  Market Wage  Number of Projects
All projects  0.356  101
Cleaning and Greening  0.800  10
Comm-Based  PWP  0.389  18
Comm-based PWP-/CEP  0  091  22
FWCP-Working  for Water  0.357  14
PILOT-Nat Dept PW  0.000  2
Transport-RDP  0.167  6
WCEDF-NEF  0.448  29
Source  Adato et. al. (1999).
Equally  appropriate  was  the  government's  re-introduction  of a low-wage  public works
program  in early  1998 following the onset of the  financial crisis to cushion the impact of the
sharp increase  in unemployment  and poverty.  The Koreans took considerable  care  to get the
design  of the  program  right.  The  program  wage  was  set at  a level  slightly  lower than  the
prevailing market wage for unskilled  labor. During the crisis,  the market wage rate fell. The
government  took measures  to adjust the  public  works  wage  rate  downwards  as the  market
wage fell. Why was Korea able to do so?
The  minimum  wage  in  Korea,  set  in  the  early  1980s,  was  never  revised  upwards.
Following the economic  boom, the  market wage  in Korea  rose dramatically and  was several
times  higher than the  legislated minimum  wage.  In fact, few  workers really bothered  much
about the level of the minimum wage, which remained very low. With the onset of the crisis,
market wages for all categories of labor fell; nonetheless  the market wage for unskilled labor
during  the  period  of the  crisis was  still  slightly  higher  than  the  (low)  minimum  wage.  As
such,  the  government  found  no  difficulty  in  adjusting  the  public  works  program  wage
downwards  with the fall in the market wage,  since the program wage was still slightly above
the legislated minimum wage (Subbarao,  1999).
Thailand's  experience  differed  from  Korea's.  During  the  boom  period,  Thailand  had
continuously  raised the  minimum  wage  in  order to  attract  labor  from  the depressed  North
East to Bangkok to work in the construction industry.  When the crisis  set in during late  1997,
the market wage  could not adjust  downward due to the prevailing  high minimum wage rate.
For the  same  reason,  the  public  works  program  wage  too  was  implemented  at  a relatively
9high minimum  wage.  The targeting  efficiency of the program and its impact on poverty are
not known.
This brief overview  of country experience  suggests  that while  setting the public works
wage at a level lower than the unskilled market wage may be difficult, several countries  have
managed  to get around the problem.  At different  points in time,  several  countries,  including
India, Argentina,  Chile, Korea,  and South Africa, managed to set the program wage at a level
conducive  to promoting  self-selection  (thus  enabling the  poor to benefit  disproportionately)
and  at  the  same  time  to  hire  skilled  workers  as  needed  at a  slightly  higher  wage.  Much
depends on country circumstances,  but there appears to be considerable  scope for innovative
solutions.  In general,  the  probability of setting the program wage  at the right level  depends
on  the  response  of the  communities  where  the  projects  are  located  and  on the  political
economy  at the national level.  This can again be illustrated by Argentina's  experience where
localities  were given the authority to set a lower wage rate than the national program  wage if
they wished to  do so.  Several provinces  in Argentina took advantage of this ability to pay a
lower wage  to expand  the  possible participation  of the  poor in  the  program,  as  it reflected
their  own  local  labor  conditions.  Flexibility  clearly  increases  the  chances  of  setting  an
appropriate wage rate.
In some countries, however, the political economy at the national level may be a binding
constraint to setting the wage rate  at a low enough level to promote  self-selection.  Often the
past history of countries  can make  it very difficult to set a low wage in workfare  programs.
(as, for example,  in the countries of Eastern Europe  and Central  Asia where there was a past
emphasis on workers rights, strong trade unionism, and the generally hostile attitude towards
a downward  adjustment  of wages  even  when  economies  are  in a downturn).  On the  other
hand,  in  some  economies  where  the  decentralization  process  is  proceeding  rapidly,  an
appropriately  low wage may be set when  community members  are fully informed about  the
goals  of the  program  and  when  decisions  are  taken  by  communities  themselves  so  that
workers (who live in communities)  actually see the merits of a low wage (Adato et al,  1999).
In all  circumstances, the wage setting process needs to be transparent if it is to be acceptable
to workers,  scheme providers, and the implementing agencies.
One question often comes up in the design of workforce programs,  how low should the
program wage  be? There  is really no theoretical  optimum, but in practice  any level  slightly
lower than the prevailing market wage for unskilled labor may be appropriate.  However, it is
important bear  in mind that the program  wage  should not be  set  at such a low level  that  it
stigmatizes the work,  thus leading the "poor but proud" people to go hungry rather than take
part in public works.  That was one of the problems with the English Poor Law workhouses
after 1834 (Lipton, 1996).
Mode of wage payment. Wages can either be paid in cash or in kind, and wage rates can
be set on a daily basis or on a piece-rate basis.  Ideally, the best form of payment is cash since
it  gives  participants  the  freedom to  spend  their  meager  earnings  in  the most  optimal  way.
However,  the  availability  of food  aid  sometimes  makes  paying  wages  in  kind preferable.
Payment  in the  early public  works  programs  in  India and Bangladesh  was  largely  in-kind,
usually  food  staples that  had been  made  available  through  donors.  Wage  payments  in the
form  of food  staples  continues  in  some  countries,  especially  those  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa.
The  problem  with paying  wages  in  the  form  of food  staples  is  obvious:  food  is  messy  to
transport,  it is costly (handling  charges),  and requires  considerable  overall  supervision.  The
10advantages  in terms of "self-targeting"  or better targeting are mixed. In Lesotho and Zambia,
payment of 50 percent of the wage  in kind (food) attracted  more women than men to project
sites (Subbarao  et al,  1997).  Given the role that women play in household food security, this
may have great indirect benefits in Africa.  On the other hand, in several other countries, both
men and women demanded  that their wages be paid in cash.
Piece-rates  and  task-based  payments  seem  especially  to attract  women  (Dev,  1996  and
Subbarao  et al,  1997). Under time-rate  systems  in which payment  is based  in part on the time
taken to produce output,  small people and others who may require or prefer extra time per-unit
of output  are  often excluded  or feel  compelled to  exclude  themselves.  Piece-rates  may  also
have  the  advantage  that several  members of a  large,  poor  family  can share  the  work.  Task-
based  payment  methods  give  women  the  flexibility  to  do  the  multiple  tasks  that are  often
required of them in poor countries.  In theory,  task-based  systems reward  and encourage  high
labor productivity.  In  some  African  countries,  women  favored  task-based  payments  because
they enabled them to dovetail their household chores with their income-earning  opportunities.
However,  experience  suggests that task-based payments  can have disadvantages  too.  In
South  Africa,  workers  did  not  understand  how  the  task  was  calculated,  were  constantly
confused  by their paychecks,  and thought they were paid  less than they expected  (Adato  et.
al.,  1999).  One  major problem  was that workers  did a  lot of preparatory  work that  was not
considered  part of the task. Participatory  surveys in South Africa showed  that there was real
confusion  about  the  meaning  of task-based  wage  payment.  In  summary,  there  may  be
considerable  administrative difficulties  in task-based wage payment systems.
The  above  discussion  underscores  the  need  to  adapt  the  mode  of payment  to  local
situations  and  demands  and  to  allow  for  temporal  flexibility.  Local  organizations  that
represent  the  poor may  help  program  planners  to  understand  poor people's  perceptions  of
their  own  needs  and  thus  help  determine  a  wage  payment  system  that  maximizes  the
participation of the poor in general and of women in particular.
Duration  and Timing of Public Works Activity.  How many person days of employment
per household should  a  workfare  program  provide?  This  depends  on:  (a)  the duration  and
frequency  of climatic  (or  systemic)  risk  in a  given  region;  (b) the degree  of uninsured  risk
confronted  by the poor;  and (c) the  size of the poverty  gap. Experience in various countries
suggests  that workfare  programs have  a  significant role  to play  in regions  or countries  that
suffer  from  periodic  monsoon  failures.  Since  a  workfare  program  can  be  geographically
targeted,  the poor  living  in any  specific  region  subject  to drought  conditions  could  benefit
from such  a program.  The poor find  it hard  to insure themselves  against risks, both natural
and idiosyncratic.  For example,  in very few countries  can poor farmers  and landless  laborers
insure  themselves  against  monsoon  failures  and  other  natural  risks,  so  the  degree  of
"uninsured risk" tends to be very high for most poor households.  In countries  and in regions
within countries  where the degree  of uninsured  risk is high and the poverty gap is wide, the
poor may be very reliant on a public workfare program to the extent that the program confers
significant "risk coping" benefits on poor households.
Evidence on how much employment has been provided per person  per year by previous
and existing public works programs is hard to come by. Most available data provide the total
number of person days of employment  created,  but from this information it is not possible to
derive  numbers  for  employment per person or per household. Nor  do  we  have  evidence
11(based  on  household  data  sets)  on  the  extent  to  which  a  poor  person's  or  household's
consumption has been met by benefits from a public works program.  The admittedly limited
evidence reviewed below is only for two countries,  India and Argentina.
In  India's  nationwide  program  of Jawahar  Rojgar  Yojnna  (JRY),  total employment  of
over 800 million person days is generated annually.  The employment provided per person per
year  varies  across  the  country,  ranging  from  15  to  30  days.  The  annual  "transfer"  benefit
from  the  program  may  not  have  been  as  high  as  in  Argentina  (see  below).  However,  the
program  operated  intensively  during  agricultural  off-peak  seasons;  annually  as  many as  55
million people  were  employed  through this program  during the  off-season.  In  other words,
the JRY  conferred  significant  stabilization  (consumption-smoothing)  benefits  even  if it did
not provide  adequate  transfer  benefits.  In the Maharashtra  Employment  Guarantee  Scheme
(MEGS),  the  transfer  benefit  has been  substantially  higher  (at  about  100  person days  per
year)  than  under  the  national  program  (JRY).  The  transfer  benefit  may  have  declined
following  the  wage hike  in  1988,  since  fewer person  days  of employment  per person  were
generated.  However,  Walker  and  Ryan  (1990)  showed  that  the risk  (stabilization)  benefits
conferred by the scheme remained significant and continued to be so even after 1988 because
the  scheme  continued  to  operate  intensively  in  off-peak  agricultural  seasons  (Subbarao,
1997).  Figure  2 shows the percentage  distribution of MEGS employment in  1980-81,  before
the  wage hike, and  in 1990-91,  after the wage hike, confirming  the continued  seasonality of
program participation in both periods.
Figure 2: The Seasonality  of MEGS Employment
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Source. Subbarao (1993 and  1997).
In Argentina's Trabajar program, the income gained by participants from working in the
program  accounted  for  about 60 percent  of household income.  Unlike  in  India, on average,
workers  in  Argentina  participated  in  a  project  for about  five  months.  After  finishing  one
project,  about one-third of workers are able to get a Trabajar job in another project. The data
for  1997-98  showed  that  about  400,000  workers  obtained  temporary jobs  in  the  program,
12each worker receiving  a transfer benefit of about $1,300 on average per year. The number of
beneficiaries represented  about one-fifth of the target population of the unemployed poor.
Evidence  from Kenya and Tanzania  (Teklu 1994) shows not only that the program wage
rate was higher than the prevailing market wage for unskilled  labor but that the timing of the
public  works  program  was  synchronized  with  the  busy  agricultural  season,  thereby
significantly  diminishing  both  the  transfer  and  stabilization  benefits  to  the  poor.  In
Bangladesh too, the workfare  program's timing coincided  with the busy agricultural  season.
In sum, the transfer  benefit  is important  for the poor especially  if the  level of seasonal
unemployment  is high. For some segments of the very poor, the stabilization  (risk reduction)
benefits may be as important as transfer  benefits.  Careful timing of the program  can enhance
such benefits.
Labor Intensity  of Public Works  Programs. An  important  determinant  of the  cost-
effectiveness  of a workfare  program  is how big  a share the wage bill constitutes of the total
cost.  Many factors  determine  the share  of wages  in total cost, particularly  the nature  of the
asset  created  and  the  availability  of  technically  and  economically  feasible  labor-based
methods  of production.  In most road  construction projects, the cost of labor ranged from 40
to  50  percent  of total  cost,  whereas  in road  or  drainage  maintenance  projects  and  in  soil
conservation  and reforestation  projects,  it ranged  from  70 to  80 percent.  In the  MEGS,  the
wage  bill  represented  60  to  70  percent  of total  cost.  Similar  ratios  were  realized  in  the
Bangladesh Food for Works Programs.
In Argentina's Trabajar program,  depending on the type of project that was being built,
the share of labor costs ranged from 30 to 70 percent. The average  share of labor costs for the
program  as  a  whole  was  40-50  percent  of total  project  costs.  In  Korea  too,  labor  costs
amounted  to close to 70 percent.
Achieving  high  labor  intensity  is  not easy  in  practice,  even  when  known  labor-based
methods of production are available.  Case studies of 101  South African projects showed that
most construction  engineers  were  averse  to adopting  labor-based  methods,  largely  due to  a
lack of familiarity with labor-based methods of production and the need for extra supervision
(and expenses)  as the  size of labor  gangs increased  (Adato  et al,  1999).  Where the  work has
been  entrusted  to  private  contractors,  the  outcome  with  respect  to  labor  intensity  is
unpredictable.  Evidence from  Ghana suggests that  the timely availability  of project  funds is
important  for  encouraging  the  adoption  of labor-based  methods.  Where  a  program  was
financed by donor funds and payments were  quick and guaranteed,  contractors  would resort
to  labor-based  methods.  Where  the  program  was  funded  by  government  funds  that  were
uncertain and were often enormously delayed,  contractors did not favor labor-based  methods
as  they  feared  strikes  for delayed  wage  payments  (Subbarao  et  al,  1997).  The  incentives
worked  exactly  in  the  opposite  way  in Argentina.  If private  contractors  are  in charge  and
have  to  meet  contract  standards,  they  are  unlikely  to  choose  labor-intensive  methods.  In
Argentina,  the  federal  government  paid  only the wage  cost.  The payments  to workers  were
generally on time and were not subject to any significant problems. The key issue was a lack
of  materials  (non-wage  inputs).  So  municipalities,  particularly  the  poor  ones,  had  an
incentive  to  go  for more  labor-intensive  projects  because  of difficulties  in  obtaining  non-
wage inputs. The issue for project management  was to  get workers  to work on projects  that
had a reasonable value for communities.
13The development  and dissemination  of labor-intensive  designs  for workfare  programs,
coupled  with quick  payments,  can  encourage  implementing  agencies  to  adopt  labor-based
methods.  Where  works  are  entrusted  to  private  contractors,  innovative  incentive  systems
need to be evolved to encourage  them to adopt labor-intensive  methods.
This  experience  with respect  to the  design  features  of previous  and  existing  workfare
programs  suggest  that  some  countries  did  manage  to  incorporate  as  many  of the  "ideal"
design  features  (see  Box  1) of  a  public  workfare  program  as  possible.  Much  can  be
accomplished  if countries planning to introduce a workfare program are aware of these ideal
design features  prior to launching a workfare  program.
Box  1: What are the Key Design Features of a Good Public Works Program?
To realize the full potential of a workfare program as a poverty-reducing  and risk-coping instrument:
*  The  wage  rate  should be  set at  a level  which  is no higher than the prevailing  market wage  for unskilled
manual  labor in  the setting in which the scheme is introduced.
*  Restrictions  on eligibility  should be  avoided;  the fact that one wants work  at this wage  rate  should ideally
be the only requirement for eligibility.
. If rationing  is required  (because  demand  for work exceeds  the budget available  at the wage  set) then the
program  should be targeted  to  poor areas,  as  indicated  by a  credible  "poverty map".  However,  flexibility
should  be allowed in future budget allocations across areas, to reflect  differences in demand for the scheme.
. The  labor  intensity  (share  of wage  bill  in  total  cost)  should  be  as high  as  possible.  The  level  of labor
intensity  will  depend  on the  relative  importance  attached  to  immediate  income  gains versus  (income  and
other) gains to the poor from the assets created. This will vary from setting to setting.
. The  projects  should  be  targeted  to  poor  areas,  and  try to  assure  that the  assets  created  are  of maximum
value  to  poor people  in  those  areas.  Any exceptions-in  which  the assets largely  benefit  the non-poor-
should  require co-financing  from the  beneficiaries,  and this money should  go back  into the budget  of the
scheme.
. Public works should be synchronized to the timing of agricultural slack seasons.
*  In  order  to  encourage  female  participation,  the  appropriate  form  of wages  is important-for  example,
women  can benefit from piece rates or task-based wages; sometimes wage in the form of food has attracted
more women  to work  sites. Also, provision of childcare  or preschool  services can  improve participation  by
women.
*  Transaction  costs  to the  poor are kept low-one  important  means  to accomplish  this  is through  locating
project  sites close  to villages.  It is also necessary to ensure appropriate  mediation  of NGOs for protecting
the rights of the poor vis-a-vis  program managers.
*  The program should include an asset maintenance  component.
Source: Ravallion (1999 and 2000) and Subbarao (1997).
Cost-effectiveness
Four variables  determine  the cost-effectiveness  of public  works programs.  These  are:  labor
intensity  (in  other  words,  the  proportion  of the  total  wage  bill  going  to  poor  workers);
targeting  performance;  net  wage  gain  (in  other  words,  gross  wages  minus  all  costs  of
participation  incurred by workers);  and the indirect benefits flowing from the assets created.
In  some  countries,  governments  require  co-financing  from  non-poor  communities  for
implementing  subprojects  that  benefit  those  neighborhoods.  In  such  instances,  the  budget
leverage  or the  share  of the  government's  outlay  that  actually benefits  the  poor,  can  be  an
additional  determinant  of the  cost-effectiveness  of the program.  Ravallion  (1999)  defined
these five variables  as follows:
14. Budget  leverage.  The  government  can  require  co-financing  from  non-poor
neighborhoods  for subprojects  that will  benefit them.  Let  government (central  plus
local)  spending  be  G,  and  let  this  spending  be  leveraged  up  to  result  in  a  total
budget of G + C, including private co-financing (C).
*  Labor  intensity.  Some of the participants  may not be poor,  so let the  share of all
wages  paid  in  total  operating  cost  be  (W+  L)/(G  +  C),  where  W  is  the  wage
received by the poor and L denotes leakage to the non-poor.
*  Targeted  labor  earnings.  This  is  the  proportion  of the  wages  paid  out  to  poor
workers, W/(W +  L).
*  Net  wage  gain.  This  is  the  share  of the  gross  wage  received  by  the  poor  after
subtracting  all  costs  of participation,  including  income  that they  may  forgo  from
other  work.  The  net  wage  gain  is  NW/W,  where  NW  stands  for  wages  net  of
forgone income or other costs of participation.
*  Indirect  benefit.  Let IB  denote the indirect  benefits  to  the  poor,  such  as when  the
assets created are local public goods in poor neighborhoods.
Ravallion's  simulations  shown in Table 4, illustrate the costs of transferring  $1 of income
to the poor in a typical  middle-income  country with a poverty rate of 20 percent and a typical
low-income  country with a poverty  rate of 50 percent.  If only current benefits are  considered,
the  cost  to  transfer  $1 of income  to  the  poor  is  estimated  to  be  $5.00  for  middle-income
countries  and $3.60 for low-income  countries. However,  if future gains from the assets created
are also included  in the benefits, the cost of transferring  $1 to the poor drops to $2.50 for both
middle-  and  low-income  countries.  Nevertheless,  at first  sight,  it  appears  that a public  works
program  is  an expensive  way  to transfer  income  and  consumption-smoothing  benefits  to  the
poor.
It  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  some  of  the  limitations  of the  cost-effectiveness
calculations  and  associated  simulations.  First, it may be helpful to generate  similar numbers
for  other  programs  and  to  compare  the  cost-effectiveness  ratios  across  programs  and
countries.  When public  workfare  programs  are  compared  with  other transfer  programs,  an
important  limitation of the cost-effectiveness  calculations  of workfare  programs  such  as  in
Ravallion  (1999)  vill  become  evident.  To  the  extent  that  a  well-designed  public  works
program  is self-targeted  and, therefore,  does not incur administrative  costs  for targeting,  the
"cost savings"  in public works may make the program  more cost-efficient than other targeted
programs.  Second,  other  targeted  programs  implemented  via  administrative  targeting  may
also  have high  leakage  costs.  Subbarao  et  al  (1997)  estimated  the  leakage  to  the  non-poor
from  targeted  food  programs  for  several  developing  countries  and  suggested  that  the
proportion of total transfer benefits to the poor range from  19 to 93 percent across countries.
For food subsidy programs  in India,  Radhakrishna and  Subbarao  (1997)  estimated the share
of expenditure  that reaches the poor to be  16 to  19 percent.  For housing subsidies  in various
countries,  Radhakrishna  and Subbarao  estimated the share accruing to households  below the
median  income  to  be  between  10  to  50 percent,  implying  very  high  levels of leakage  of
benefits  to  the  non-poor.  Thus,  available  estimates  of leakage  and  administrative  costs
suggests  that, after  a careful  comparison,  one  may find that other programs do a lot worse
than public works programs in terms of  cost-effectiveness.
15Table 4: Cost-effectiveness  of Two Hypothetical Workfare Programs under Base  Case
Assumptions
Middle-Income Country  Low-Income Country
(poverty rate=20%)  (poverty rate=50%l)
Budget leverage:  (G+C)/G  1.0  1.0
Labor intensity: (W+L)/(G+C)  0.33  0.5
Targeting:  W/(W+L)  1.0  0.75
Net wage gain. NW/W  0.6  0.75
Poor peoples' share of total benefits: lB/SB  0.2  0.25
Benefit/cost ratio: SB/(G+C)  1.0  0.5
Current + future gains to the poor per $ of
spending:  B/G  0.40  0.41
Cost of $1 gain to the poor  $2.50  $2.50
Current earnings gain per $ of program
spending: CB/G  0.20  0.28
Cost of $1 extra current earnings  $5.00  $3.60
Source. Ravallion (1999).
A  third  limitation  of cost-effectiveness  calculations  as  shown  in  Table  4  is  that  the
benefit estimates consider only the transfer benefits.  The risk benefits,  that is, the benefits  of
reduced  risks  due  to  consumption  smoothing,  are  rarely  factored  into  calculations  of cost-
effectiveness.  We  have  noted that these  risk  benefits may  be extremely  important  for poor
people who lack access to risk-coping instruments or who cannot afford to insure themselves
against  potential  risks  of income/consumption  shortfalls.  If  work is  easily  obtained  at sites
close  to  the  homes  of participants,  workfare  programs  can  respond  to  risks  of sudden
shortfalls in consumption of poor households better than most other safety net programs.
Fourth, the cost-effectiveness  calculations  shown  in Table 4 take  into account only the
direct transfer  benefits.  Indirect  benefits  in terms of the program's  short-  and medium-term
impact  on the  rural  market wage  rate  is rarely  evaluated.  If  public  works programs  offer a
near-guarantee  of employment  during off-peak  seasons,  it is possible  that the market  wage
rate for unskilled labor may increase as a result of the higher reservation wage  induced by the
public  works  program.  One  study  does  estimate  these  indirect  gains,  in  the  case  of the
Maharahstra Employment Guarantee  Scheme (Gaiha, 2000).  With an analytical model, Gaiha
tracked  the  interdependence  between  the  agricultural  market  wage,  the MEGS  wage,  and
non-farm wages.  The study found that the program has had substantive indirect benefits;  for
example,  if  MEGS wages were to rise by Rs. 1,  rural farm wages  would increase by Rs.0. 17
in the short run and by Rs.0.28  in the long run.
Finally, the future benefits  of a public  works program  can be  substantial.  Gaiha  (2000)
noted  that  the  benefits  to  the  rural  economy  of Maharashtra  of the  assets  created  by the
MEGS program have been considerable.
To  sum  up,  cost-effectiveness  calculations  are  important,  but  the numbers  need to  be
interpreted  with caution.  In particular,  it is important to  bear in mind,  on the costs side, the
16implicit savings  in costs induced  by self-selection.  Both  direct and opportunity  costs need to
be  factored  into the  calculations.  On the  benefits  side, failing  to  recognize  both direct  and
indirect  benefits or second-round benefits may underestimate the total benefits of a workfare
program and may yield apparently  unfavorable  cost-benefit ratios.  Thus, while a simple cost-
effectiveness  calculation  that  fails  to  take  into  account  the  above  factors  might  show  a
workfare  program  to  be  expensive,  it may actually  be  cost-effective  when  both  direct  and
indirect benefits are taken into account  and when compared  with other transfer programs.
Implementation Issues
Although  labor-intensive  public  works  programs  have  the  potential  for creating  short-term
employment and for improved risk management  by poor households,  several implementation
issues may  arise.  Different  countries  have very different  institutional  capacity for designing
and  implementing  public  works  programs.  Countries  such  as  India  and  Bangladesh  have
gradually  built  their  in-country  capacity  to  implement  public  works  programs,  especially
during periods  of crop  failures.  However,  this  capacity  to  implement  workfare  programs  is
somewhat  limited  in  African  countries.  Although  international  agencies  (such as the  WFP,
the ILO,  and bilateral agencies)  have been active in public works programs  in many African
countries,  "the  record  on  efficiency  and  effectiveness  appears  to  be  mixed"  (von  Braun,
Teklu,  and Web,  1992).  The major implementation  issues  are:  how do  funds  flow;  how are
projects  selected,  how much self-selection  is practiced  by participants,  and how well  is the
program monitored.
Among the world's  largest  and best known  rural  and urban public works  programs  are
India's  nationwide  Jawahar  Rojgar Yojana  (JRY)  and  the Employment  Assurance  Scheme
(EAS), both designed to help to ensure gainful employment for poor households and to create
rural  and  urban  infrastructure.  The  two  programs  are  administered  very  differently.
According  to the  World  Bank:  "The  JRY  is  administratively  complex.  Of the  total  funds
made available,  75 percent  is earmarked for various rural infrastructure  schemes;  and the rest
goes  to  social  forestry  projects.  All,  however,  are  allocated  to the  states according  to  a set
formula based on the proportion  of poor persons residing in each one.  States in turn allocate
JRY funds to districts based on population  shares and an index  of backwardness.  From there
JRY  funds  pass  down  to  block  and  village  level  strictly  according  to  population  shares.
Unique  in  its  decentralization-work  plans  and  contracts  are  administered  by  the  village
panchayats  (elected  local  bodies),  subject  to  the  basic  program  guidelines  and  overall
clearance  of the  work program by the District Rural Development  Authority  (DRDA)-the
JRY generates an estimated  1 billion person days of employment each year, an achievement,
which  translates  into  the  likely  participation  of  some  30  to  40  percent  of  potential
beneficiaries"  (World Bank,  1998). Thus  the program is largely supply-driven,  implemented
by  local  bodies  but subject  to pre-determined  centrally  devised  guidelines.  In  contrast,  the
EAS  is  demand-driven.  District  authorities  apply  directly  to  central  administration  for
funding,  and allocations  are made based on the size and backwardness  of geographic  blocks
included  in each  district.  Unlike in JRY,  the  District Collector  has overall responsibility  for
coordinating the work and allocating funds among blocks within a district.
Participatory  assessments  of both programs  in  India's  largest  state  of Uttar  Pradesh
have pointed  to poor implementation.  Decisions as to who participates  in the program are
taken by the  elected officials  at  the village  level,  who often  exclude members  of some  of
the socially deprived communities  in some provinces.  The poor have a different perception
17of  the  main  objective  of  public  works  programs  from  the  professed  objectives.  For
example,  most poor participants  perceived  the  JRY  and EAS  as  infrastructure  projects to
build roads  and bridges  and not as programs  intended  to provide employment and income
support  to the poor to prevent off-seasonal  shortfalls  in consumption.  These findings  from
the participatory  evaluation  suggest that, regardless  of the differences  in the flow of funds
and  the  differing  approaches  of the  two programs  (supply-driven  versus  demand-driven),
implementation  problems  still  persist  even  in the  country  with the  longest  experience  of
implementing  such programs.
The experience  of implementing  the Trajabar  workfare  program  in Argentina has been
positive.  As in India, it is a large-scale program,  but unlike  in India, several  factors enabled
the  Argentine  program  to  be  implemented  more  effectively  than  the  Indian  program.  In
Argentina,  there  were  very  clear  and  transparent  guidelines from  the  central  government,
leaving  local  and  municipal  authorities  to  manage  the  details  of implementation.  The
project's staff were highly committed,  funds were distributed across municipalities  following
transparent and objective  criteria (according to the distribution of the poor and unemployed),
and there was a focus on monitoring and evaluation  so problems could be identified early and
dealt with.  Proven  project evaluation  and  supervision procedures  were  adapted  from  social
funds and successfully  implemented.  To further enhance transparency,  details of the selected
projects were published, as were lists of selected project beneficiaries.
In  some  Latin  and  Central  American  countries,  small-scale  public  works  projects  have
been  implemented  under  the  aegis  of  Social  Investment  Funds  (for  example,  in  Bolivia,
Honduras,  El Salvador, Peru, Panama, and Nicaragua).  Communities submit ideas for potential
projects to the Social Investment Funds (SIFs), which then screen these ideas for viability after
doing a quick cost-benefit  analysis.  Unlike in India's JRY and EAS programs,  the projects are
submitted by the  communities  and  so are  demand-driven.  Local  communities  implement  the
approved  projects  themselves,  albeit  by hiring  private  contractors.  Many  have  focused  on
building or repairing social infrastructure  such as schools and hospital buildings. Most projects
have  created  temporary  jobs  lasting  five  to  six  months.  In  Bolivia,  the  oldest  of the  SIF
interventions,  the implementation  and targeting performance  has been good;  77 percent of the
participants  came  from the  poorest  40 percent  of the  population.  After the intervention,  the
average  worker increased  his income  by 67 percent  (Jorgenson,  Grosh, and  Schachter,  1992).
However,  regional targeting  in the initial  stages was not pro-poor,  largely because  the poorest
regions  lacked  the  capacity  to  "demand"  projects,  but this  deficiency  was  corrected  as  the
program  improved  its geographic  targeting.  The  Bolivian program  (the  ESF) won praise  for
speedy and efficient implementation  and for significant benefits to the economy;  each ESF job
created an  additional  1.1  jobs in the  economy,  and the projected  rates of return  to  approved
projects  was 22 percent.  Following  the successful  launch  of the  ESF in Bolivia,  a number of
other  Latin  American  countries  introduced  SIFs (Honduras,  El  Salvador,  Peru,  Panama,  and
Nicaragua).  Financing  infrastructure  through  small-scale  public  works  has  been  one  of the
main components  of SIFs in all countries.  Although generating employment  was not the main
motivation behind  the  SIFs, many infrastructure  projects did generate temporary  employment
lasting five to  six months  in some  of the poorest  communities.  Nonetheless,  all  SIFs  had to
confront  one major  implementation  problem.  The  SIFs were not responsible  for the execution
of the projects; the choice and implementation were left entirely to the communities. Since very
poor communities  lacked  the capacity to develop  projects, these communities  received  fewer
project benefits  than the relatively richer communities in most SIF projects. However, the SIFs
did provide an opportunity for communities  to register their demands and to  influence project
18selection;  moreover,  the recent generation  of SIFs has  begun to  address the issue of building
capacity in poor communities.
In Africa too,  quite a few public works projects  were financed  and sponsored  by Social
Investment  Funds.  By  1998,  19 public  works  projects  were  being  implemented  through the
medium  of SIFs  in  12  African  countries  including  Senegal,  Guinea  Bissau,  Madagascar,
Mauritania,  and Ghana (Frigenti  and Harth, 1998). Over half of these projects were supported
by several  donors  in  addition  to  the  World  Bank.  The  principles  governing  these  projects
were  the  same  as  in  Latin  America;  project  proposals  were  prepared  by  communities  and
submitted to  the SIF  for  financing  and approval.  In Mauritania,  for example,  neighborhood
and  town  meetings  determine  priorities  and  select  projects.  Because  one  goal  of these
programs  is to use small-scale private  construction contractors,  the autonomous status  of the
implementing  agencies  has  proved  to  be  important  for  processing  bids  rapidly,  awarding
contracts  expeditiously  and  without  political  interference,  and  accelerating  payments  to
contractors.  In general,  the preparation  of SIF-led projects has been very transparent and  free
from  cumbersome  government procedures,  though there are  some cross-country  differences.
In  Senegal,  AGETIP's  success  in  implementing  public  works  was  largely  because  of its
insulation  from  clientelistic  politics  (Marc  et  al,  1995).  By contrast,  Ghana's  public  works
program  was  integrated  into  various  government  ministries  and  consequently  experienced
delays in implementation.
It is worth stressing that public  works activities  under SIFs have always  been typically
small-scale; hence  the implementation  experience of these projects is not  strictly comparable
with national  programs in Chile, India, Korea,  Indonesia, or Argentina.
Various  ministries  or  government  departments  in  some  African  countries  have
implemented  public  works  projects  on  a  large  scale,  albeit  with  donor  funds.  The  main
motivation  of these  projects  is to  provide  food  security  during periods  of crop failure  (for
example,  in Ethiopia).  In  implementing  such  projects,  however,  evidence  suggests  that the
public works departments  of governments typically favor equipment-based  methods because
they  are  perceived  to  be  superior  and  to  complete  the  works  faster  than  labor-intensive
methods.  It is possible that in some countries equipment-intensive  projects may offer greater
opportunities  for rent-seeking (Stock and de Veen,  1996).
In some  countries (such as Ghana) the task of implementing public works was entrusted
to private  contractors.  Evidence  suggests  that contractors  have  also  been  reluctant to adopt
labor-intensive  public works,  largely because of the complexities involved in managing large
labor gangs. (Stock and de Veen,  1996). In addition,  in projects  financed by the government,
delays in payments have  often discouraged  private contractors from adopting labor-intensive
methods  because  they fear  that workers  will strike  in the  event of delayed  wage  payments
due to delays in the receipt by the contractors of funds from the government.  Labor-intensive
methods were more likely to be adopted in donor-funded projects where contractors received
prompt payments.  This contrasts with the experience of Argentina where no such constraints
were allowed to emerge.
In Zimbabwe, two major programs operated.  The Food-for-Works  program replaced  the
free  distribution  of food  in  1989.  Villagers  selected  the  projects  themselves.  Local  food
security  was  the  primary  goal,  so  other  aspects  of  the  program  such  as  quality  and
maintenance  suffered.  A second  program of public works  began  a few years  later  with the
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people, and the government provided  materials and tools. In Zimbabwe,  there has been much
greater  community  participation  than  is  often  the  case,  and  the  demand-driven  nature  of
projects should be commended.
Experience  gained thus far suggests  that financing  arrangements  and the flow of funds
do  influence  the  programs'  critical  design  features,  including  their  labor  intensity.  The
financing  arrangements  in African  countries  are  very  different  from  those  found in  South
Asia  and  Latin America.  First,  in  much  of Africa,  public  projects  are  donor  funded,  with
domestic  contributions being negligible.  Thus  in Tanzania, the labor-intensive  public  works
(road  construction  and  maintenance)  program was jointly  supported by the  UNDP  and the
ILO,  with contributions  from Netherlands,  Germany,  and Denmark.  The contribution  of the
Government  of Tanzania  was  11  percent of the total cost.  The early programs in Kenya  and
Botswana were also heavily  donor-funded.  The second major difference  is that in Africa, the
provision  of capital  budgets  by  donors  was  often  tied  to  technical  assistance.  The  third
difference  is that in Africa, responsibility for implementing  the programs  largely rested with
government  departments  (the  Ministry  of Public  Works  in  Kenya,  the  Ministry  of Local
Government  and Lands in Botswana,  and the Prime  Minister's office in Tanzania).  Because
programs were  implemented  largely  by government  agencies as part of their "routine"  work
program,  little  attention  was  paid  to  such  details  as  the  timing  of the  program  or  the
monitoring  and  quality  of the  infrastructure  that  was  built.  For  example,  in  Tanzania,  the
timing of the works program  was not synchronized  with the agricultural  slack seasons.  In all
programs,  a uniform  wage  was set, regardless  of the type  of work done,  the location of the
work  site, or variations  among workers in terms of their age,  sex, education,  and experience
(Teklu,  1994). "The restrictive  structure of pan-territorial wage  rates limited the flexibility of
the  road programs  to adjust  wage  rates  in  accordance  with  local  labor  supply  conditions"
(Teklu,  1994).  Teklu  also  noted that  the  long-term  benefits  of public  works  projects  were
much diminished in Tanzania due to the poor maintenance of assets.
One question that often arises in the implementation of a workfare program is who should
be considered  eligible  to participate  in the program.  Some countries  have  laid down specific
criteria.  For  example,  in  Korea,  only  one  member  per  household,  the  head  of  household
(usually  a  male),  can  participate.  When  the  household  head  is  receiving  an  unemployment
benefit, the spouse (usually a female member of the household) is not allowed to participate. In
other words,  although  the low wage  rate  could  have promoted  self-selection,  the system  was
not  allowed  to operate  because of additional  restrictions  on participation that  were  imposed.
After  the wage rate is fixed low enough to promote self-selection,  the decision whether  or not
to participate  and who should participate  (a male or female member of the household or both)
should be left to the household,  but few countries seem to follow this principle.
Another  problem  is  a  lack  of capacity  in  many  Africa  countries.  When  programs  are
donor-funded  and last  only a  short time (typically  three or four months  following a drought),
domestic  capacity  is  unlikely  to  be  built.  In  this  respect,  the  experience  of  India  and
Bangladesh  are worth contrasting  with the experience of African  countries. In both Bangladesh
and India, most public works projects operate throughout the year, albeit with seasonal ups and
downs  in  coverage,  and  as  a  result,  much  domestic  capacity  is  created  over  time.  When
capacity  is unknown,  which is often the case  in some countries,  the designers of public works
programs  may  find  it  useful  to  initiate  a  pilot  phase  during  which  the  capacity  of the
implementing agency can be tested and lessons drawn. Projects that rely chiefly on government
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delays and limited technical, administrative,  financial, and participatory capacities.
When  many  donors  are  implementing  different  public  works  programs  in  the  same
country,  a lack  of coordination  can  unduly stretch  scarce  administrative  capacity,  and  this
often means that the coverage  of these programs  is neither  extensive nor deep.  Most public
works projects  in Africa  do  not have  clear criteria  for  initiation,  expansion,  contraction,  or
dissolution.  Far  from  being  a  guarantee  of being  there  when  needed,  public  works  have
operated  in  much  of  Africa  when  donor  funding  was  available  regardless  of  need.
Fragmented  coverage  and  weak  capacity  to  respond  in  times  of need  undermines  the
credibility  of public  works  programs  to  perform  their  insurance  function  for  the  poor  of
Africa.  In all  countries generally and  in Sub-Saharan African  countries  in particular,  assured
funding,  community  participation,  sound technical  assistance,  and  proper  understanding  of
the communities  and  social  structures  where the  projects  are located  can vastly increase  the
effectiveness  of workfare programs  as a risk-mitigating intervention.
V. Evaluation of Public Works Programs: Impacts on Poverty and Welfare
There  are  few rigorous  evaluations  of the  impacts  of public  works  programs  in developing
countries,  however the evidence  available  suggests that well-designed  public works  can  be
successful  in both targeting benefits and conferring  social gains to the most needy.
Targeting Performance
Evaluations  of workfare  programs  in  general  and  of MEGS  in particular  suggest  that  it is
possible  for  governments  to  use  this  kind  of program  to  confer  significant  transfer  and
stabilization  benefits  on poor  households.  As  for  targeting  outcomes,  60  to  70  percent  of
households  participating  in  India's  nationwide  program,  the  MEGS,  and  in  Argentina's
Trabajar  program  and almost  100 percent  in Chile's public works program belonged to poor
households.  India's  National  Sample  Survey  data  for  1993-94  contained  data  about
household  participation  in  three  key  safety  net  programs:  public  works  schemes,  the
Integrated  Rural  Development  Program  (IRDP),  a micro  finance  program),  and  the Public
Distribution  System  (PDS),  a  food  subsidy  program.  Considering  the  data  on  program
participation  along  with  the  data  on  total  consumption  expenditure  per  person  at  the
household  level  makes  it  possible  to  determine  the  current  distribution  of benefits  from
public  spending  across  income  groups  for  these  three  important  safety  net  programs.
Research  by Lanjouw and Ravallion  (1998)  shows that the poorest quintile is well served  by
public  works  programs,  with  the  credit  program  (IRDP)  in  second  place,  and  the  food
subsidy program (PDS) doing least well in reaching the poor (Table 5).
Even in middle-income  countries  such as Argentina,  workfare  programs have  served as
useful  safety nets  during  macro  economic  crises.  Jalan  and  Ravallion  (1999)  used  survey-
based impact evaluation methods to assess the gains made by participating  workers  and their
families  from  the  Trabajar  program  in  Argentina.  They  used  propensity-score  matching
methods to construct a comparison  group to Trabajar participants  from an identical  national
sample  survey  implemented  at  the  same  time.  They  then  estimated  income  gains  by
comparing  the  incomes  of the  Trabajar participants  with those  of the matched  comparison
group.  Their  results  indicated  that  the  Trabajar  jobs  were  well  targeted  to  the  poor;  for
example,  80 percent  of participating  workers  came  from families  with  a per capita income
21that places them among the poorest 20 percent of Argentineans  nationally, while  60 percent
came from the poorest decile.
Table 5: Marginal Odds of Participation in India' Main Antipoverty Program in Rural Areas
Integrated  Rural  Public Distribution
Quintile  Public  works programs  Development Program  System
1  1.16  1.11  1.06
(poorest)  (3.27)  (15.49)  (8.14)
2  0.93  1.28  0.99
(3.64)  (17.73)  (7.26)
3  0.80  1.21  0.91
(2.98)  (23.52)  (6.88)
4  0.92  0.96  0.86
(4.32)  (19.09)  (7.16)
5  0.55  0.39  0.81
(3.29)  (8.06)  (6.27)
Note  The  table  gives  the  instrumental  estimates  of the  regression  coefficients  of the  quintile-specific
program  participation  rates  across regions  on the  average  rate by state  for that program.  The  leave-out  mean
participation rate  is the instrument for the actual  mean. The numbers  in parentheses are t-ratios.
Source. Lanjouw and  Ravallion (1999); calculations  based on the  1993-94 National  Sample Survey.
An evaluation of the experience of public works in South Africa is now available (Adato
et  al,  1999).  With  respect  to  targeting  performance,  the  outcomes  appear  to be  somewhat
mixed. Using socioeconomic  data at the district  level, the study found that some districts  with
very high levels of poverty and unemployment  had no projects,  while some with low levels
of poverty had benefited from several. Although women were among the main target groups,
only 23 percent of the employment generated by the programs actually went to women.
In  the  Philippines,  largely  because  of a  relatively  high wage  rate  (cash  plus  in kind
wages),  participants  in  public  works programs  appeared  to come from  marginally poor and
non-poor families rather than from ultra-poor families (Subbarao et al,  1997).
Social Gains
It  appears  that well-designed  workfare  programs  do have  the potential  to confer significant
social gains. For example,  India's Maharastra  Employment  Guarantee  Scheme was designed
to  encourage the participation  of women.  Employment was provided within 5 km from their
places  of residence,  creche  facilities  were  provided,  and male-female  wage  discrimination
was eliminated.  As a result, close to half of all participants  were  women.  Datt and Ravallion
(1992)  have quantified  the impact of the program  and found that the severity of poverty has
fallen  from  5.0  percent  to  3.2  percent  owing  to participation  in the MEGS.  In  addition  to
economic  (transfer)  gains,  Dev (1996)  notes that there  have  been social  gains:  "The MEGS
also  discourages  sexual  barriers  and  inequality...  Women  now  dress  better  and  their
economic power has given them a better status in their families."
22VI. How  to Plan, Implement, and Evaluate Public Works Programs: A
Synthesis
Figure  3 provides  a  schematic  view  of the  considerations  that  should  be  borne  in  mind  a
priori  at different stages in the planning of public workfare programs.
Figure 3: Designing  and Implementing Public Works
Stages  What You  Should Consider
What you need:
Capital  Source  of financing:  If out of general  tax revenues,
Food/Cash  Consider competing demands from other public goods
Implementing Agencies,  Consider  other  demands  on  scarce  institutional  and
Institutions  *  administrative  resources
Choice of projects; community involvement
Public Works Projects  |  . Technical feasibility,  labor intensity
Level of the wage rate,  mode of payment
_  Targeting effectiveness
Labor market effects
Immediate  Impacts  . Transfer gains
Employment  Stabilization  Gains; improved risk management
________________  oCost-effectiveness
Distributional  impacts of assets created
Medium-term  impacts: Assets  o  Second round employment  effects
Quality of assets; Asset maintenance
Gender impacts, women's empowerment
Other Spin Offs  Food Security;  improved nutrition
e  Community mobilization
Source: Author.
First, it is important to begin with the sources and adequacy of financing.  If the program
is to be  financed  out of general tax  revenues, it is useful to consider competing  demands for
money  to generate  public  goods  vital for the  welfare of poor households.  Second,  program
planners  need to  consider technical  feasibility,  the  level  of the  wage  rate  and the  mode of
payment, the choice  of projects,  and community involvement.  Third, the implications  of the
choice  of  projects  and  the  wage  rate  on  targeting  effectiveness  in  particular  and  the
program's labor market impact  in general need to be considered.  Fourth, the potential of the
program to make  stabilize the incomes  and reduce the risks faced by poor households needs
to  be  borne  in  mind.  Finally,  in terms  of impact,  it is  important  to consider the  program's
effects  on  income  distribution,  any  second-round  employment  effects  it  may  have,  any
effects  on  the  gender  gap,  and  its  cost  effectiveness.  Other  spin-offs  such  as  community
mobilization, women's empowerment,  and other social gains also need to be considered.
23In designing  and implementing  the program, four general  conclusions  from experiences
I have reviewed above need to be borne in mind:
(a)  The  level  of the  wage  rate  is critical  for  determining  the  distribution  of benefits
from the program, as well as its targeting effectiveness.
(b)  The timing and duration of employment often determine the stabilization  gains from
the programn.  It is important to remember that, even if transfer benefits are small, the
program's stabilization  (risk) benefits may be large, especially in economies subject
to periodic natural disasters.
(c)  The program can be designed to attract the participation of women, a high degree of
involvement  of  the  private  sector  or  non-governmental  agencies,  and  low
transaction costs of participation for the poor.
(d)  In order to achieve  an acceptable  level of cost-effectiveness,  it is very important to
be concerned  not only about  the level of the wage  rate but also  the degree  of labor
intensity, the quality  of the assets created  and the extent to which the poor actually
benefit from the assets that are created,  and the second-round  employment  benefits
arising out of those assets.
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Public workfare programs  have been  important  counter-cyclical
program  interventions in both developed and developing countries.
In the developing world generally and in Africa  and Asia particularly,
public works programs  have been  significant policy instruments for
mitigating the negative effects of cliniatic and systemic risks on poor
farmers  and  unskilled and semi-skilled workers. The  paper first
discusses the  rationale behind workfare  programs  in the context of
social risk management  and goes on  to give an overview of workfare
programs  in Africa and Asia with respect to such design  features as
wage  rates and labor  intensity and to how they were  selected and
implemented.  Using available estimates and evaluations, the evidence
on  whether these programs have achieved their goals and are cost-
effective is presented.  Finally, the paper concludes with summary
lessons from  experience.
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